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Abstract
Cultural norms diverge substantially across societies, often even within the
same country. In the present paper, we study the voluntary settlement hypoth-
esis, proposing that individualistic people tend to self-select into migrating out
of reach from collectivist states towards the periphery and that such patterns
of historical migration are reflected even in the contemporary distribution of
norms. During most of the first millennium CE, the modern north of Vietnam
was under an exogenously imposed Chinese rule. From the eleventh to the
eighteenth centuries, historical Vietnam gradually expanded its territory to
the Mekong River Delta through various waves of conquest and migration. In
contrast to some recent research, we find very little support from historical
sources for any major discontinuities in this territorial expansion. Combining
archives with household survey and lab-in-the-field experiment, we demon-
strate that areas being annexed earlier into historical Vietnam are nowadays
more (less) prone to collectivist (individualist) culture. We argue that the
southward out-migration of individualistic people was the main mechanism
behind this finding, which is also in line with many historical accounts.
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1 Introduction
Economic research has uncovered strong associations between many cultural traits and
various indicators of individual behavior, institutional and economic development (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2011; Fernández 2011; Algan and Cahuc 2014; Doepke and Zilibotti
2014; Alesina and Giuliano 2014, 2015).1 Among them, the individualism-collectivism
(IC) contrast has been found to be a powerful predictor of long-run democratic and eco-
nomic development in a large sample of countries (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2011, 2015,
2017; Olsson and Paik 2016a).2 The basic idea is that an individualist culture is conducive
to technological and institutional innovations since it emphasizes personal initiative, value
and achievement. Meanwhile a collectivist culture is favorable to collective action as it
prioritizes individual embeddedness and conformity to group norms and values. In terms
of innovation, collectivism only has a static effect, on the other hand individualism has a
dynamic effect. Hence the latter dominates over longer horizons and individualist societies
perform better with respect to economic and institutional development. The empirical
findings of the IC contrast naturally lead us to an important question: why are some
societies more (less) collectivist (individualist) than others?
In the present paper, we hypothesize that cultural differences along the IC dimension
across modern societies can be traced back to territorial expansion and migration pro-
cesses that happened in the historical times. We investigate a version of the voluntary
settlement hypothesis, proposing that as collectivist societies emerged, they triggered the
out-migration of individualistic members towards peripheral regions. This migration pat-
tern then repeated over and over again as the individualistic immigrants inhabited and
developed the new peripheral regions into less collectivist communities compared to the
ones they left behind, which in turn induced more individualistic members to migrate to-
wards more peripheral regions. Eventually, these migration processes gave rise to cultural
differences along the IC dimension across communities, which have persisted through time
and constituted the cultural landscape found in the present day.
1 Some notable traits are generalized trust, individualism-collectivism, family ties, generalized morality,
and attitudes toward work and the perception of poverty.
2 The IC contrast has also been the single most relevant cultural dimension in cultural psychology (see the
review in Gorodnichenko and Roland 2012). For an early literature survey on theory and measurement
of the IC contrast in social psychology, see Triandis (1995).
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We recognize the territorial expansion process in the history of Vietnam as an ideal
setting to empirically examine the voluntary settlement hypothesis. During most of the
first millennium, the modern north of Vietnam was under the colonization of the cen-
tralized imperial bureaucracy of historical China. After gaining independence in 939 CE,
historical Vietnam initially governed the region surrounding the Red River plain with
a rice-agriculture economy, a centralized bureaucratic system, and a collectivist social
organization. Meanwhile, the territory in the south was sparsely populated by other in-
digenous people who were largely unaffected by Chinese influence. From the eleventh to
the eighteenth centuries, historical Vietnam gradually expanded its territory along the
coast from the Red River to the Mekong River plains through various waves of conquest
and migration, which in turn displaced most of the indigenous people, to establish a
country as today (see Figure 1).3 We hypothesize that as historical Vietnam expanded
its territory, individualistic people self-selected into migrating towards the annexed ar-
eas. This pattern repeated over and over again through eight centuries and eventually
generated cultural differences along the IC dimension across regions in historical Vietnam
whereby the most individualistic people inhabited the most recently annexed regions.
Most importantly, these cultural differences have persisted to the modern day.
[Figure 1 is about here.]
To test the above hypothesis, ideally, one would first need historical data to show that
people who migrated to and inhabited the annexed areas were more individualistic than
those who stayed in the initial regions of historical Vietnam, which in turn generated
cultural differences along the IC dimension across regions back in at least the eighteenth
century. Then, one should collect present-day data and conduct a proper empirical anal-
ysis to provide convincing causal evidence that descendants in these annexed areas are
nowadays also more individualistic than descendants in the initial regions.
To emulate this ideal setting, we first review historical studies showing that historical
Vietnamese who migrated and inhabited in the annexed areas possessed typical char-
acteristics of individualist culture, and that cultural differences along the IC dimension
across regions in historical Vietnam had already been in place as early as the eighteenth
3 The Vietnamese southern advance is well documented in typical historiographies written by Vietnamese
(Le 1982) and Western scholars (Taylor 2013).
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century. To capture the IC dimension in the present day, we focus on the societal ability
to solve collective action problems, which is a critical feature in theoretical models linking
the IC trait to economic and institutional development (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2015,
2017). We then conduct a reduced-form analysis linking the key explanatory variable, i.e.
the time elapsed since being annexed into historical Vietnam, to the indicators of the IC
dimension in the present day. Our hypothesis thus states that those areas being annexed
into historical Vietnam earlier are nowadays more prone to collectivist norms.
Using the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey, we aggregate data on household
labor contributions to public goods production at district level to measure the societal
ability to solve collective action problems. Three indicators are constructed based on
labor contributions to public goods production: (i) the percentage of households and
(ii) the number of members per household making contributions and (iii) the number
of days contributed per household. We find that districts being annexed into historical
Vietnam earlier nowadays have higher percentages of households and numbers of members
per household making labor contributions as well as numbers of days contributed per
household. The estimated effects are substantial and robust to various control variables
as well as different empirical specifications including an instrumental variable estimation.
Furthermore, we also distinguish the migration of individualistic people in historical times
from other potential channels in explaining these cultural differences including differential
living conditions in the annexed areas, Western influence in the Mekong River plain and
important population movements in the modern history.
To investigate the voluntary settlement hypothesis further, we carry out a lab-in-the-
field public goods experiment with high-school students from the north and the south of
Vietnam. In doing so, we expect the public goods experiment to capture the prevailing
cooperation attitudes in the north and the south. To ensure the credibility in terms of
causal inference, we take a great care in selecting experimental sites in a way to separate
the voluntary settlement hypothesis from other potential channels mentioned above. We
find that students from the north contribute significantly more in the public goods exper-
iment compared to their southern peers, and that the result is mainly driven by the belief
about the contribution levels of other subjects. To sum up, this finding thus corroborates
the survey data analysis and suggests that the cultural differences along the IC dimension
across regions are also present in the youngest generation of the country.
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Our research relates to a growing multidisciplinary literature on the origins of cultural
differences along the IC dimension.4 The pathogen hypothesis argues that societies with
historically greater prevalence of disease-causing pathogens are nowadays more prone to
collectivism because its emphasis on in-group/out-group distinction and conformity can
serve as an anti-pathogen defense function (Fincher et al. 2008). The ecological context
theory posits that some forms of production in subsistence economies (such as farming)
require more functional interdependence than others (such as hunting) and hence give rise
to collectivism as an adaptation mechanism (e.g. Vandello and Cohen 1999; Talhelm et al.
2014). Motivated by the history of settlement in the United States and its well-known
individualist culture, Kitayama et al. (2006, 2009) put forward and provide experimental
evidence for the voluntary settlement hypothesis, which postulates that voluntary set-
tlers are likely to have a highly autonomous, independent, and goal-oriented mental set
(see also Bazzi, Fiszbein, and Gebresilasse 2017). Olsson and Paik (2016b) argue and
provide cross-country evidence that the advent of farming in the core regions during the
Neolithic Revolution were accompanied with collectivism, which in turn induced individu-
alistic farmers to out-migrate towards peripheral areas and eventually gave rise to cultural
differences along the IC dimension between societies.
Our research builds on and adds to this literature in various ways. First, to the extent
of our knowledge, no studies on the origins of cultural differences along the IC dimension
have examined the societal ability to solve collective action problems. Second, our research
combines survey and experimental data in a coherent manner to study the same type of
indicator, i.e. contribution to public goods production. Finally, studies in this literature
so far have mostly employed cross-country comparisons and concentrated on developed
societies, and it is well-known that these countries have gone through the modernization
process to a great extent. Developing countries, on the other hand, have still retained most
of their traditional cultural landscapes. Using the setting within a developing country,
our research thus corroborates Olsson and Paik (2016b) and Kitayama et al. (2006, 2009)
in establishing the role of the migration of individualistic people over the long term in
explaining cultural differences along the IC dimension across societies.
4 The modernization hypothesis, arguing that societies become more individualistic as they reach higher
levels of economic development, essentially focuses on the convergent tendency towards individualism,
rather than pre-existing cultural differences, across modern societies (Inglehart and Baker 2000).
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Within economics, our research joins a growing literature aimed at understanding the
persistence of various cultural traits as an important channel through which historical
events could exercise their impacts on current economic development.5 Our paper is also
closely related to a recent study involving Vietnamese history by Dell, Lane, and Queru-
bin (2017). Using a regression discontinuity design to compare villages along a presumed
fixed 150-year border between historical Vietnam and the territory in the Mekong Delta,
then controlled by the Khmer empire, the authors show that today’s living standards are
higher in the more strongly centralized territories of the former. As one possible mech-
anism behind this finding, the authors argue that the strong state in historical Vietnam
was better at instilling norms promoting collective action, which is reflected by a better
ability to organize for public goods and redistribution through civil society and local gov-
ernment. Although the two papers reach a similar conclusion as regards the strong ability
of historical Vietnam to promote collective action, our voluntary settlement interpretation
of the finding and explicit focus on the IC dimension, differentiate our approaches. We
further argue that our approach of studying the gradual southward expansion of histori-
cal Vietnam as a more or less continuous historical process, is strongly supported by the
official chronicles of historical Vietnam, i.e. Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (204 BCE-1675
CE) and Dai Nam Thuc Luc (1558-1888 CE). Indeed, our Vietnamese sources provide
very weak support for alternative scenarios assuming an exploitable 150-year fixed border
between the Khmer empire and historical Vietnam.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
the historical background of the southward territorial expansion of historical Vietnam and
the accompanied migration process, together with details on historical sources to support
our interpretation of the Vietnamese southern advance. Section 3 presents the analysis
with survey data including empirical strategy, data, and results. Section 4 describes the
experimental design, site selection, and results. Section 5 closes the paper with some
concluding remarks.
5 Some remarkable traits are gender equality (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Hansen, Jensen, and
Skovsgaard 2015), trust (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Becker et al. 2016; Bigoni et al. 2016; Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2016; Litina 2016), preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
2007; Basten and Betz 2013), and various others such as anti-semitic attitude (Voigtländer and Voth
2012), time preference (Galor and Özak 2016), and civic values (Lowes et al. 2017). See Nunn (2012,
2014) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) for critical reviews of the literature.
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2 Historical Background
Archaeological evidence indicates that ancient populations had settled down in the Red
River plain with rice agriculture around 2000 BCE during the Neolithic Revolution
(Nguyen, Pham, and Tong 2004). Oral history maintains that these people belonged
to various tribes among whom was the Lac, ancestor of the Vietnamese (Taylor 2013).
The whole region of what is now northern Vietnam was brought under the control of
Han China already in 111 BCE. This external intervention initiated a long period of Chi-
nese colonization during most of the first millennium CE. After the victory in 939 CE,
the first stable state of historical Vietnam was founded in 968 CE and endowed with a
centralized bureaucratic system from the colonizer. Subsequent dynasties governing this
land continued to build stronger structures and orders into the society by adopting the
Confucian doctrine, whose basic tenet emphasized the values of social groups above the
needs and desires of its constituent members (Whitmore 1984, 1997). The lingering mil-
itary threat from China in the north further necessitated a strong military organization
with its associated collectivist norms. The strength of this collectivist society was best
demonstrated in the warfare history of historical Vietnam, e.g. being the only land-based
polity in Eurasia to defeat the Mongols in the thirteenth century.
Peripheral areas in the south of historical Vietnam were initially places where people
belonging to marginalized social classes such as landless peasants, refugees, fugitives, and
adventurers, often sought livings (Taylor 2013). This group “lacked standing in a social
group, like the family or the village, was less than a full person and could hope for no
better future in traditional village society” (Tana 1998, p. 111). Because they were not
recognized in the collectivist society, we argue that they were more inclined towards an
individualistic mindset typical of pioneer societies.6 Gradually from the eleventh to the
eighteenth centuries, this type of people was induced to migrate southward as historical
Vietnam conquered and established its administration along the coast to the Mekong
River Delta. While some of them had already inhabited the annexed areas long before
the historical states reached there, most of them migrated to seek fortune in the south
as the states granted private property rights on any new cleared croplands (Taylor 2013).
They thus “had learned to rely on their own resources and initiative to a degree not
6 One may recall the analogous image of European immigrants to the United States during the age of
mass migration (e.g. Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012).
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possible in the north” (Taylor 2013, p. 252). These resourceful immigrants together with
their wet-rice technology later on transformed the Mekong River Delta from a wild marshy
land into a prosperous agricultural economy (Tana 1998; Taylor 2013).
The Vietnamese southern advance took place gradually through various steps. Avail-
able historical sources appear to be in agreement that this process effectively ended in
1757 and they provide very little support for assuming any major discontinuities.7 In
each step, the state conquered and established its administration in the annexed territory,
which induced a more individualistic population to migrate further south. During this
territorial expansion, historical Vietnamese (the Kinh ethnicity) immigrants displaced
indigenous people in the annexed areas, most of whom ran away and sought living in
neighboring territories while a few others stayed and assimilated in Vietnamese culture
(Taylor 2013).8 The state capital was also shifted from modern Ha Noi to modern Thua
Thien Hue (see Figure 1). The social environment in the annexed region was character-
ized by greater openness, mobility and autonomy relative to the north, “a new way of
being Vietnamese” (Tana 1998). Respecting these cultural differences, Gia Long (1802-
1820 CE), the first king of the Nguyen dynasty, governed from the capital in the central
and delegated two viceroys with a high level of autonomy, one with literary and one with
military backgrounds, to govern the northern and southern regions respectively (Taylor
2013). In contrast, his successor Minh Mang (1820-1841 CE) determined to impose by
force more uniformity in government, religion, culture, and even apparel for the whole
country. These policies had reduced the cultural diversity to a large extent and provoked
many rebels in the southern region (Wook 2004; Taylor 2013).
The modern Vietnamese history started with the French Colonization in 1858 CE
when the colonizers took control of the South East and Mekong River Delta (see Figure
1), and around 20 years later they did so with the whole country. Following the end
7 For secondary sources, see Briggs (1947, p. 358), Nguyen (1999, p. 18), Engelbert (1994, p. 173), and
Taylor (2013, p. 325-336). For a detailed chronological description in the primary historical sources
of the Vietnamese southern advance, see the Supplementary Materials. In contrast, Dell, Lane, and
Querubin (2017) claim that the southern region in modern Vietnam was divided by a fixed border
between the Khmer empire and historical Vietnam from 1698 until 1833, i.e. just prior to the French
Colonization in 1859.
8 These groups nowadays only constitute minor fractions in the Vietnamese population, for example in
1979 the Cham 0.2% and the Khmer 1.4% compared to the Kinh 87% (Dien 2002).
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of this colonization was the Second Indochina War (1954-1975 CE), during which the
country was divided into the socialist North and the capitalist South. Whether this
recent experience with Western capitalism in the southern region, or the more distant past,
was the main driver of the cultural differences in Vietnam is an empirical question and
examined further below. After the Reunification in 1975, the central planning economy
was implemented with limited success and subsequent economic reforms during the last
30 years have brought prosperity and modernization to the whole country.
To summarize, cultural differences across regions in Vietnam, as in any other countries,
are well expressed in various anecdotes, many of which are stereotypes or even prejudices.
There are, however, some serious observations worth mentioning. Ending his Vietnamese
historiography, Taylor (2013, p. 624) argues that cultural differences across regions in
Vietnam have well persisted to the modern day, that “northerners are more disciplined to
accept and to exercise government authority” and “southerners are more individualistic,
egalitarian, entrepreneurial, interested in wealth more than in authority”. In a practical
guide to doing business and living in Vietnam, although regarding collectivism as the
main cultural theme, Ashwill and Diep (2005) note that “northerners are considered to be
more intelligent, conservative, austere, serious, and frugal, ..., are more apt to save for a
rainy day” (p. 71) and “southerners are perceived as fun-loving, easy-going, open people
who rarely think of saving for a rainy day” (p. 72). Scant empirical evidence indicates
that southerners are more loss averse, but not different from northerners with respect to
patience or present bias (Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 2010).
3 Survey Data Analysis
3.1 Empirical Model
In this section, we use the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) as our
main dataset to investigate the voluntary settlement hypothesis. Our baseline empirical
model revolves around regressing various indicators of the IC dimension on an explanatory
variable capturing the time elapsed since being annexed into historical Vietnam while
controlling for other potential channels. Owing to data availability, we measure culture
at district level through aggregation from individual data.9 The model thus takes the
9 There is certainly individual heterogeneity within a society, but in aggregation one can observe what
social psychologists call “cultural syndrome” of each society (Triandis 1995). This is also a standard
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following form:
ICi = βT imeSinceAnnexedi + γXi + i.
In this equation, ICi is a measure of the average expression of cultural norms in district
i, TimeSinceAnnexedi is the time since being annexed into historical Vietnam, Xi is a
set of control variables, and i is a random error term. Our hypothesis postulates that β
is positive (negative) with respect to collectivist (individualist) norms. All variables are
described in detail in the subsection below.
There are two sources of endogeneity that may threaten causal inference of the time
since being annexed variable. The first one is reverse causality, i.e. the more collectivist a
society was the earlier it was annexed by historical Vietnam. Historical evidence, however,
does not suggest that this is a strong cause of concern. First, there were fundamental
differences between the indigenous culture of historical Vietnam and the Sinic civilization
when historical China colonized the region (Taylor 1983). And most importantly, later
conquests of historical Vietnam into the south were either unintentional responses to
attacks from southern enemies or primarily driven by economic calculation to appropriate
land resource for agricultural production (Tana 1998). The second threat comes from
various omitted variables that may influence both the time since being annexed into
historical Vietnam and the IC dimension.
To examine the potential endogeneity bias problem, an instrumental variable (IV)
estimation is employed. We argue that while many factors might play a role in the
decision to annex an area, the north-south geographical order is impossible to manipulate
and hence exogenous to the decision. In other words, from the Red River plain, one could
not conquer the Mekong River plain without annexing all areas located in between.10
Thus, in the subsample of the annexed areas, the north-south geographical order can
serve as a valid instrument for the time since being annexed into historical Vietnam.
We propose to use the walking distance along the coast from an annexed area to the
military center of historical Vietnam (modern Nghe An) as such an instrument. From
exercise in economics, see Alesina and Giuliano (2015) for a review.
10Theoretically, one could do so by either passing the ocean in the east or the mountainous band in the
west separating historical Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia. Both strategies were arguably impossible
given the logistic and transportation technologies in historical Vietnam. We indeed do not find any
attempt to do so in the historical narratives.
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north to south, one needed to pass through modern Thua Thien Hue and Ninh Thuan (see
Figure 1). The walking distance (instead of the geodesic, “bird-fly” distance) is therefore
employed to capture the military route in the historical times.
3.2 Variables
The IC Trait
In the present paper, we adopt the conventional definition of culture in the multidisci-
plinary literature as “decision making heuristics or a rules of thumb that have evolved
given our need to make decisions in complex and uncertain environments” (Nunn 2012,
p. S109).11 Using survey data, there are two strategies to measure culture. The first is
to construct direct indicators extracted from value survey such as the WVS (Olsson and
Paik 2016b). Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the WVS in Vietnam to conduct a causal
analysis since it does not contain detailed locational information of the respondents.12
The second is to employ indirect outcomes extracted from observational data such as
marriage stability, inventiveness, family structure, or infrequent children names (Vandello
and Cohen 1999; Talhelm et al. 2014; Bazzi, Fiszbein, and Gebresilasse 2017). To be a
good measure of the IC trait, we argue that an outcome has to be both theoretically and
practically relevant. In other words, it has to capture an important aspect of the IC trait
and feature as a traditional practice in the society under study.
For our main analysis, we employ labor contribution to public goods production (e.g
building or repairing infrastructure roads, wells, irrigation, schools or health clinics) to
capture the strength of collectivism based on two underpinnings. From a theoretical per-
spective, the ability to solve collective action problems is a critical feature of collectivist
societies (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2015, 2017). Since collectivist societies are consid-
ered to be better in this aspect, one should observe their members to contribute more
resources to public goods production. From a practical perspective, labor contribution to
public goods production (such as irrigation facilities, roads, and communal buildings) has
also been a typical activity among people in historical Vietnam (e.g. Adams and Hancock
1970). This tradition is still prevalent in the modern day, especially in rural areas, as labor
11This definition is closely related to another prominent one used in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006,
p. 23): “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged
from generation to generation.”
12A descriptive analysis using the WVS is presented in the Supplementary Materials.
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is probably the most abundant resource that people possess. Exploiting the VHLSS, we
construct three related variables at district level based on labor contributions to public
goods production: (i) the percentage of households and (ii) the number of members per
household making contributions, and (iii) the number of days contributed per household.
The VHLSS covers all provinces in Vietnam with information on geographical location
at district level that enables one to conduct a nuanced empirical analysis. Although the
basic structure is the same, many contents of the survey have changed over time since the
first round in 1992. Thus, owing to data availability, we only employ the 2002 survey round
in the empirical investigation. The 2002 sample was drawn from the 1999 Population
Census and covered 607 districts across 61 provinces. Appendix A1 shows that around
26 percent of households contributing labor to public goods production, whereas 0.44 and
3.24 are respectively the numbers of members and days contributed per household. To
avoid blank areas for non-surveyed districts on the map in Figure 2, we aggregate all three
variables at province level and depict them. A visual comparison with Figure 1 gives an
impression that provinces being annexed into historical Vietnam earlier nowadays have
higher percentages of households and numbers of members per household making labor
contributions as well as numbers of days contributed per household.
[Figure 2 is about here.]
The Time since Being Annexed into Historical Vietnam
As already mentioned above, our main explanatory variable is the time elapsed since
being annexed into historical Vietnam, measured in number of 100 years. Following
the historical background discussed above, we choose the first unified state of historical
Vietnam in 968 CE as the beginning year to code this variable. For any year chosen,
however, it only affects areas in the initial territory. And as shown in the following
empirical analysis, the result remains qualitatively unchanged when the estimation is
restricted to the subsample covering only the annexed areas. The terminal year is 1990.13
To construct this variable for each modern district, two dimensions are needed: (i)
its corresponding area in historical Vietnam and (ii) the year that this area was annexed
into historical Vietnam.14 For the time dimension, we rely on two official chronicles
13This is an arbitrary choice. The results are robust to other choices and available upon request.
14All details on the coding procedure are presented in the Supplementary Materials.
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of historical Vietnam, Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu (Cao 2012) and Dai Nam Thuc Luc
(Nguyen 2002), which record events from the beginning to 1675 CE and in the periods
1558-1888 CE respectively. These chronicles were written by top scholars of the historical
states of Vietnam to keep track of historical events for future generation, and constituted
the primary sources for all Vietnamese historiographies that we are aware of. We consider
an area to be annexed when there is a record in the chronicles saying that this area either
a tribute to or was conquered by historical Vietnam, which means the state could start
establishing its administration and collecting tax. To link areas in historical Vietnam to
their modern counterparts, we rely on two seminal works of Vietnamese historians: Dao
(2005) and Phan et al. (2011). Given that the administrative boundaries had changed
many times throughout history, matching historical areas with modern units is apparently
not a perfect mapping. This is more of a problem at district level, which potentially drives
the estimated coefficient towards zero. As shown in the following empirical analysis,
however, the time since being annexed into historical Vietnam does carry enough signal
to deliver a satisfactory statistical performance.
In our context, the time since being annexed into historical Vietnam captures the
migration channel whereby the most individualistic migrants occupied the most recently
annexed areas. However, one might argue that it also reflects the length of time that
the historical states of Vietnam had in instituting collectivist norms and values into the
people. In other words, the longer an area experienced the control of historical Vietnam,
the stronger was its collectivism. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, the above
historical discussion indicates that a dominant weight should be assigned to the voluntary
settlement hypothesis since most of the Vietnamese immigrants only moved to the annexed
areas after the states had conquered them. Thus, in terms of state experience, these
immigrants generally had the same duration as those who stayed in the old areas.
Control Variables
We prepare two sets of control variables to be included in the regression analysis whose
descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A1. The first is intended to capture district
demographics, which is constructed by aggregating standard household characteristics
including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender,
age and schooling years. We use dummy variables for the Kinh ethnicity (historical
Vietnamese) and male household head.
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The second set of control variables consists of various potentially confounding factors
normally found in the literature. The first one is per capita expenditure accounting for
the influence of modernization (Inglehart and Baker 2000). The percentage of cropland
in total land area is used as a control for the prevalence of agriculture (Talhelm et al.
2014), which is mainly rice in the context of Vietnam. The third variable is natural
land productivity, aimed at capturing the incentive to cooperate, as motivated in Litina
(2016). Finally, Triandis (1995) hypothesizes that isolated and densely populated areas
are conducive to the development of collectivist culture. To account for these factors,
we control for elevation, terrain ruggedness and population density. Finally, we also
control for latitude following the popular practice in empirical studies although there is
no theoretical underpinning for its impact on the IC trait.
Information on per capita expenditure is taken directly from the VHLSS. The percent-
age of cropland is taken from the Global Land Cover Characteristics Database, which is
constructed at 30 arc-second resolution based on satellite inputs in the period of 1992-1993
(Loveland et al. 2000). Natural land productivity is measured by the caloric suitability
index constructed at 5 arc-minute resolution by Galor and Özak (2016), who make their
calculation based on data from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones. This index measures
the average potential yield (million kilo calories per squared kilometer per year) attainable
in each grid cell given the set of crops that are suitable for cultivation in the post-1500 pe-
riod. To capture the natural component of productivity, the production conditions are set
at low level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture with the climatic conditions (precipitation,
temperature, etc.) are taken from the baseline period 1961-1990.
Elevation is taken from the GTOPO30 dataset provided by the Earth Resources Ob-
servation and Science Center. The terrain ruggedness index is originally devised by Riley,
DeGloria, and Elliot (1999) to quantify topographic heterogeneity in wildlife habitats pro-
viding concealment for preys and lookout posts. This index is calculated at 30 arc-second
resolution across the entire surface of the Earth by Nunn and Puga (2012) based on the
GTOPO30 dataset. Finally, population density is taken from the Gridded Population of
the World Version 3 provided by the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network (CIESIN and CIAT 2005). The data are from 1990, which is the earliest year
available. Latitude and distance are measure at the district centroids using data taken
from the Global Administrative Unit Layers.
14
Owing to data availability, we cannot control for an important factor found in pre-
vious studies, i.e. historical pathogen prevalence. For several reasons, we think that
this omission does not seriously impact our analysis. First, because Vietnam is a small
country located within the tropical climate zone, the geographical variation in historical
pathogen prevalence is arguably not substantial. Indeed, the history of disease ecology do
not indicate any significant north-south difference in disease environment (Bamber 1993;
Taylor 1993). Second, pathogens have been shown to be more prevalent in hot regions
(Guernier, Hochberg, and Guégan 2004), which are also more favorable to growing rice.
Indeed, Talhelm et al. (2014) shows that, across provinces in China, pathogen prevalence
is insignificantly related to the IC trait when rice agriculture (percentage of cultivated
land) is controlled for. Finally, the instrumental variable strategy mentioned above is
adopted exactly to give us a clue on this issue.
3.3 Baseline Results
In the following analysis, we focus on the number of days contributed per household to
public goods production and report the corresponding results regarding the percentage
of households and the number of members per household making labor contributions in
the Appendix. Table 1 presents the result of regressing the number of days contributed
per household on the time since being annexed into historical Vietnam and standard de-
mographic characteristics. As can be seen, the estimated coefficient of the time since
being annexed is significantly positive whether demographic controls are included or not.
Districts being annexed into historical Vietnam earlier nowadays on average have a higher
number of days contributed per household. Relative to the mean number of days con-
tributed, the marginal effect is reasonably large and stable through various regressions. In
the full specification, for example, one 100-year increase in the time since being annexed
is associated with roughly 0.52 more days contributed per household, which is roughly 13
percent of the mean value. The time since being annexed also accounts for approximately
11 percent of the total variation in the number of days contributed, which is one half the
part explained by all the demographic controls. Districts having higher average head age
and percentage of Kinh heads are significantly associated with less days contributed, while
higher average household size and percentage of male heads are significantly associated
with more days contributed.
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[Table 1 is about here.]
Table 2 reports the result of including additional control variables. The estimated
coefficient of the time since being annexed remains relatively unchanged in sign, absolute
value, and statistical significance. The estimated coefficient of per capita expenditure has
a positive sign but is insignificant. The estimated coefficient of the percentage of crop-
land is significant and negative when entering alone but turns insignificant and positive
in the full specification. The significant and negative estimated coefficient of the caloric
suitability index indicates that higher natural land productivity is associated with lower
number of days contributed, which is in line with the finding in Litina (2016). While the
positive estimated coefficient of ruggedness turns insignificant in the full specification, the
significant estimated coefficients of the average elevation and population density suggest
that more highly elevated and densely populated areas are respectively associated with
higher and lower numbers of days contributed. These additional control variables all to-
gether only account for roughly another five percent of the total variation in the number of
days contributed per household. While latitude has an insignificant estimated coefficient,
adding it results in a substantially inflated standard error of the estimated coefficient of
the time since being annexed and even reduces the adjusted R2. This is not a surprise
given the high correlation between the two variables (Pearson’s coefficient = 0.97). We
thus exclude latitude in the rest of the empirical analysis.
[Table 2 is about here.]
3.4 Robustness Analysis
Although many control variables have been introduced, it is hardly enough to claim that
there is no omitted variable bias left in the regression model. As mentioned above, a
stronger test is to restrict the analysis to the sub-sample of annexed areas and employ
the walking distance to modern Nghe An as an instrumental variable for the time since
being annexed into historical Vietnam. Table 3 reports the results of the instrumental
variable estimation using 2SLS estimator. The estimated coefficient of the time since
being annexed remains relatively unchanged in sign and statistical significance whether
or not all control variables are included. Relative to the mean number of days contributed,
the marginal effect increases substantially, which indicates the presence of measurement
errors. In addition, the first-stage estimations show that the distance to Nghe An is
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a strong predictor of the time since being annexed, i.e. it has significant and negative
estimated coefficients. Finally, we reject the exogeneity assumption of the time since
annexed when it enters the regression alone, but we cannot do so when demographic
characteristics and additional controls are included. Conditioning on our control variables,
the time since being annexed is arguably exogenous and hence the above result from the
OLS estimator is valid.
[Table 3 is about here.]
There are various complications of the historical process that may influence our inter-
pretation of the above result as supporting the voluntary settlement hypothesis. First,
historical Vietnamese immigrants (the Kinh ethnicity) often inhabited along the coastal
plain with their traditional rice agriculture, while the highland areas were mainly inhab-
ited by other ethnic tribes. After the Reunification in 1975, the Kinh started to migrate
more to the highland areas in large scale through a state-sponsored program under the
central planning economy to establish new production zones. This later migration, there-
fore, might be different from the one that happened in the historical times. We thus
exclude from the analysis all districts in the highland areas, i.e. where average elevation
are above 500 meters.15 Furthermore, we also exclude two provinces of Ha Noi and Ho
Chi Minh City, which are two biggest venues for immigrants in the modern time. Table
4 shows that the estimated coefficient of the time since being annexed remains relatively
unchanged in sign, absolute value, and statistical significance (Columns 1-3).
[Table 4 is about here.]
Second, we choose the first stable state after gaining independence from historical
China as the starting point in constructing the time since being annexed into historical
Vietnam. One may, however, argue that this choice is just arbitrary. In addition, these
initial areas were different from the annexed areas in many important aspects. For ex-
ample, as mentioned above, historical Vietnamese immigrants had to face harsh living
conditions and inhabited along various indigenous groups as they moved into the annexed
areas. Finally, historical studies have also argued that the annexed areas in the south were
15The result is robust to other values such as 400 and 600 meters, and is available upon request.
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governed by a more flexible and open administrative system (e.g. Tana 1998). These en-
vironmental and institutional factors might be the causes of cultural differences in the
annexed areas other than the immigration of individualistic people. To purify the volun-
tary settlement hypothesis further, we thus continue to exclude all districts in the initial
territory of the first historical state from the analysis. Table 4 shows that the estimated
coefficient of the time since being annexed remains relatively unchanged in sign, absolute
value, and statistical significance in this subsample (Columns 4-6).
Finally, around 20 years before taking the whole Vietnam, the French colonizers had
taken control of the furthest south (Cochinchina) in 1858 CE, the place where they in-
habited the most. During 20 years of the Second Indochina War, these areas were also
subjected to a capitalist regime influenced by the United States. One therefore may argue
that these more recent experiences with the Western world had created the more individ-
ualistic culture in the Mekong River plain other than the immigration of individualistic
people in the further past. To examine this possibility, we include a dummy variable for
the former Cochinchina, i.e. the modern South East and Mekong River Delta regions, in
the regression. Although this dummy variable apparently captures many other things be-
sides earlier Western contact, this exercise can be taken as the simplest check of Western
influence. Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficient of the time since being annexed
remains relatively unchanged in sign, absolute value, and statistical significance (Columns
7-9). Meanwhile, the dummy variable for Cochinchina has negative estimated coefficients,
but highly insignificant.
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix also report the results of replicating the above
analysis to the percentage of households and the number of members per household mak-
ing labor contributions to public goods production. The estimated coefficients of the time
since being annexed are also significant and positive as regards these two indicators. Areas
being annexed earlier nowadays on average have a higher percentage of households and
number of members per household making labor contributions. The marginal effects are
also reasonably large and stable in various specifications. These findings altogether thus
indicate that areas being annexed earlier into historical Vietnam nowadays have higher
levels of labor contribution to public goods production in terms of not only intensity but
also prevalence. In the Supplementary Materials, we also conduct additional robustness
checks including aggregating variables from the VHLSS with sampling weights and us-
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ing standard errors adjusted for potential spatial autocorrelation followed the method
developed by Conley (1999). The results in general remain relatively intact.
3.5 Discussion
The analysis so far has shown that labor contribution to public goods production is
both more intensive and prevalent in areas being annexed earlier into historical Vietnam.
More importantly, this result is not driven by population movements in the modern day,
differential living environment in the annexed areas or past contacts with the Western
world in the south. These findings altogether lend support to the voluntary settlement
hypothesis as the main explanation behind the cultural differences along the IC dimension
across regions in Vietnam.
There nonetheless remains some limitations. First, our empirical strategy may not
fully account for other institutional channels through which the time since being annexed
into historical Vietnam might influence labor contribution to public goods production.
For example, the government might spend less on infrastructure in areas being annexed
earlier, which in turn might induce people in these areas to contribute more. In this case,
the time since being annexed does not have an influence on labor contribution through
the cultural channel, but instead through the government spending allocation. Second,
the survey data we have used only have information until 2002, which naturally leads to
the question if our finding can be carried over today. Third, money is certainly another
form of contribution to public goods besides labor in the modern day. Hence, we should
also be able to observe similar variation across societies when money contributions are
involved rather than labor. Finally, the survey data reflect a situation where people may
observe the labor contributions of others from the same district, and one may be curious
if this cultural difference presents in an impersonal setting where decision is anonymous.
We thus conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to examine these questions in details.
4 Experimental Evidence
4.1 Site Selection
Before describing the public goods experiment, we explain our strategy in choosing ex-
perimental sites in ways to differentiate the voluntary settlement hypothesis from other
potential channels as discussed above. First, we focus on the annexed areas to rule out
differences in historical living environment. Second, we restrict to the territory of the
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former south during the Second Indochina War (1954-1975) to eliminate the confounding
effects of different regimes in the north and the south during this period. Third, we pick
provinces located along the coast, which was the route that historical Vietnamese often
migrated and settled down. In these provinces, we also pick rural districts locating along
the coast. Fourth, we choose provinces, and rural districts in them, that were historically
inhabited mainly by the Kinh ethnicity (historical Vietnamese) and whose populations
have been living there for many generations. In this subsample, we randomly pick one
district with the longest time since being annexed into historical Vietnam and one district
in the youngest region, i.e. the Mekong Delta. Finally, we use the VHLSS 2014, which is
the latest round, to find districts having similar levels of economic development based on
income per capita. This process narrows our selection to one rural district in Thua Thien
Hue Province and one rural district in Ben Tre Province (see Figure 1).
Each district in Vietnam has around 3 to 5 high schools, and we choose one in each.
To maximize the sample size and representativeness, given the resource constraint, we
pick schools that have more than 200 students and locate in the centers of the districts.
The participation rates of students in the experiment are relatively similar, i.e. 70 percent
in the north (140 out of 200) and 73 percent (235 out of 320) in the south. In accordance
with our expectation, 98 percent of the subjects were born in the chosen districts, while
95 percent their parents were so. All subjects are from the same cohort, i.e. 97 percent
of them were born in 1999. All subjects from the north, and 97 percent from the south,
say that their households have contributed in at least one among many public building
activities including road, school, health facilities, dam, and commune houses.
4.2 The Experiment
We conduct a public goods experiment with high-school students from the north and the
south of Vietnam to analyze attitudes towards cooperation.16 By using an experimental
approach, we can keep the institutional setting constant and carefully select our sites to
enable a causal investigation of the voluntary settlement hypothesis. We use high-school
students as our subjects in the experiment since they are old enough to embody the
cultural environments of the places where they grew up, but still have not been affected
16For a general discussion on public goods experiment see Zelmer (2003) and Chaudhuri (2011).
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by living or working outside their community.17 The experimental design thus allows a
direct test of the voluntary settlement hypothesis by comparing the contribution levels
to the public goods between the selected sites. In other words, we expect subjects in the
north to share a stronger cultural norm of cooperation and hence on average contribute
at a higher level compared to subjects from the south.
We build our design on the one-shot linear public goods experiment developed by
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001). For other experiments using this design, see, e.g.
Kocher et al. (2008), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Fis-
chbacher, Gächter, and Quercia (2012), and Martinsson, Villegas-Palacio, and Wollbrant
(2015). We begin by describing the public goods experiment before discussing the details
of Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001)’s design. The subjects are randomly assigned
to groups of three, each member comes from a different class at the high school. This
feature of the design is chosen to avoid that subjects are allocated to groups consisting of
classmates. All subjects receive an endowment of 20 tokens and have to decide simultane-
ously how much of their endowments to invest in a public good. The marginal per capita
return (MPCR) from the public good is 0.5, which means that each token given to the
public goods results in 0.5 token to all group members including the one who gives the
token. If a subject is rational and selfish, then a MPCR below one leads to a dominant
strategy to free ride, i.e. to contribute zero to the public good. Nevertheless, it is socially
optimal to contribute the whole endowment if MPCR × n > 1, where n is the number
of group members. Our choice of the MPCR of 0.5 thus generates the conflict between
private and social optima that characterizes a public good. The payoff for subject i is
given by two components, (i) the amount of the endowment that is not invested in the
public goods (20− ci) and (ii) the return from the public good:
pii = (20− ci) + (0.5
∑3
j=1 cj).
Each token earned is exchanged to money at the rate of one token equals 3000 Vietnamese
Dong. The experiment is calibrated such that each student on average receives a monetary
payoff worth roughly three daily meals.
The specific design feature of Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) is that they use
the strategy method. Each subject makes two types of contribution decisions to the
17This strategy has also been used earlier in the literature, e.g. Kocher, Martinsson, and Visser (2012).
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public good: (i) unconditional contribution and (ii) conditional contribution. In the un-
conditional decision, which is similar to a standard public goods experiment, each subject
states how much she would like to contribute to the public goods from her endowment
of 20 tokens. In the conditional decision, a subject states how much she would like to
contribute conditional on the average contribution of the other two group members. We
round off the possible average contributions of the other two group members to integer
numbers ranging from 0 to 20. A subject thus makes 21 conditional decisions in total.
All decisions are incentive compatible by using the following strategy. For two randomly
selected group members, it is the unconditional contribution to the public good that is
pay-off relevant. For the third member, the average unconditional contribution of the
other two group members is calculated, and the contribution of the third member is then
determined from her conditional contribution given the average contribution of the other
two group members. Thus, when making her decisions, a subject does not know which
decision would be pay-off relevant. The experimental procedure was carefully described
to the subjects before the experiment began, and various examples were given to ensure
that the subjects understood.18
The strength of the strategy method is that subjects can be categorized into different
types based on their conditional contributions to the public good. We use the same
classification proposed in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001). A subject is classified as
a “conditional cooperator” if her conditional contribution increases weakly monotonically
with the average contribution of the other two group members or the relationship between
her conditional contribution and the others’ average contribution is positive and significant
at 1 percent significance level using a Spearman rank correlation coefficient. A “free rider”
is a subject who contributes zero to the public good for all levels of the other members’
average contributions. A “hump-shaped” contributor is characterized by a subject who
shows weakly monotonically increasing contributions with a Spearman rank correlation
coefficient at 1 percent significance level, which is similar to a conditional contributor, but
only up to an inflection point. For average contribution levels by others above this level,
her own conditional contributions decrease weakly monotonically or show a significant and
18Details on the experimental instruction can be found in the Supplementary Materials. The public
goods experiment is the first experiment in a bigger project, in which the second experiment is pay-off
independent from the first one.
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negative Spearman rank correlation coefficient at the 1 percent significance level. Those
who cannot be categorized based on above criteria are referred to as “others”.
4.3 Result
The average contribution level in our sample is 6.92, which is fairly similar to what have
been found in the literature (Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2011). Table 5 shows that subjects
from the north unconditionally contributed 7.50 tokens on average while their peers from
the south did so at 6.58 tokens, and the difference is significant (Mann-Whitney U test).
Subjects from the north on average also gave a significantly higher guess about the average
contribution of other members compared to their peers in the south, i.e. 8.25 versus 7.60
tokens. Except for free riders, other types in the north on average have higher levels of
unconditional contribution and guess about the average contribution of other members
compared to their counterparts in the south. The distributions of types are similar across
the north and the south, i.e. the percentages of free riders are 3.62 in the north and 5.53
in the south while the corresponding numbers for conditional cooperators are 52.17 and
54.04 percent. We indeed cannot reject the null hypothesis that the compositions of types
in the north and the south are drawn from the same distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test). This finding suggests that the north-south difference in contribution behaviors is
driven by belief rather than the composition of types.
[Table 5 is about here.]
To examine the result further, we use regress analysis to control for measures of risk
attitude, trust perception, and social preferences as well as standard socioeconomic vari-
ables. The basic idea is to examine if these variables influence the contribution decision
rather than the belief about the average contribution of the other two group members.
Risk attitude is measured using a question validated by Dohmen et al. (2011) in which re-
spondents are asked to rate their willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 to 10. Subjects
also answer a question followed the format in the WVS as regards the extent to which
they trust their friends.19 We code trust “completely” and “somewhat” as one, and do not
trust very much and do not trust at all as zero. Social preferences are captured through
six hypothetical situations of allocating money between the subject and an anonymous
19We did not get the approval of the authority to ask about trust in schoolmates and villagers.
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person proposed by Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011), based on which subjects
are classified as altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and competitive. We code altruists
and prosocials as one, and the rest as zero. The socioeconomic variables include gender,
household size, and a wealth index.20
Table 6 shows that the estimated coefficient of the north dummy is significantly posi-
tive with a marginal effect slightly smaller than the mean difference when standard socioe-
conomic characteristics are controlled for. The role of belief about the average contribution
of the other two group members in driving the unconditional contribution is confirmed in
the regression where it has a significant and positive estimated coefficient. Conditioning
on this belief, the estimated coefficient of the north dummy is reduced substantially in
both size and significance. Furthermore, the influence of belief about the average con-
tribution of the other two group members on one’s contribution behavior is found to be
stronger in the north, which is reflected through the significant and positive estimated
coefficient of the interaction term between belief and the north dummy.
[Table 6 is about here.]
The dummy for conditional cooperators has an insignificant estimated coefficient. The
measure of risk attitude has a significant and positive estimated coefficient, which indi-
cates that more risk-taking subjects are willing to contribute more. Trust in friends has an
insignificant estimated coefficient. The socially oriented dummy (altruists and prosocials)
also has an insignificant estimated coefficient. Finally, all socioeconomic variables have
insignificant estimated coefficients (not shown). When all control variables are included
separately or together, the estimated coefficients of the north dummy and its interaction
with belief about the average contribution of the other two group members remain quali-
tatively intact.21 To sum up, the regression analysis thus confirms that belief is the main
driver behind the north-south difference in contribution behaviors. We take this finding
as evidence for a stronger cultural norm of cooperation in the north.
20The wealth index is constructed by extracting the first principal component of six variables measuring
the numbers of mobile phone, computer, motorbike, refrigerator, gas cooker, and air conditioner that
the households possess.
21We also include the interaction terms between the north dummy and four control variables and the
result remains qualitatively intact. Details are available upon request.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The IC contrast has been found to be a powerful predictor of long-run democratic and
economic development in a large sample of countries. Thus, why some societies have be-
come more collectivist or individualistic than others is a crucial question in understanding
long-run comparative development. In the present paper, we study the voluntary settle-
ment hypothesis, postulating that cultural differences along the IC dimension are driven
by the out-migration of individualistic people from collectivist societies to settled down
in less (more) collectivist (individualistic) peripheries. We recognize the grand territorial
expansion from the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries in historical Vietnam as an ideal
empirical setting. During this period, historical Vietnam gradually expanded its territory
southward along the coast from the Red River Delta to the Mekong River Delta through
various waves of conquest and migration to form a country as today.
We examine the ability to solve collective action problems, which is a critical feature of
collectivist societies, by using data on contribution to public goods. Combining archives
with household survey, we find that areas being annexed earlier into historical Vietnam
nowadays have higher levels of labor contribution to public goods production in terms of
not only intensity but also prevalence. We eliminate many potential interpretations for
this finding including differential living conditions in the annexed areas, Western influence
in the Mekong River plain and important population movements in the modern history.
To strengthen our analysis, we also conduct a public goods experiment with high-school
students from the north and the south in which we carefully select experimental sites in
ways to differentiate the voluntary settlement hypothesis from other potential channels.
We find that students from the north contribute significantly more in the public goods
experiment compared to their southern peers, and that the result is mainly driven by
the belief about the contribution levels of other subjects. We argue that the southward
out-migration of individualistic people was the main mechanism behind these cultural
differences, which is also in line with many historical accounts.
We believe that the present paper provides a valuable input for understanding long-run
comparative development. First and foremost, the migration patterns in the distant past
played a crucial role in explaining cultural divergence across modern societies. As time
goes on, similar processes may continue to enhance cultural differences across societies,
which in turn may influence comparative development in the coming times.
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Figure 1. The Vietnamese Southern Advance
Source: Authors’ construction.
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A. Percentage of Households B. Number of Members C. Number of Days
Figure 2. Labor Contribution to Public Goods Production
Source: VHLSS 2002, aggregation without sampling weights.
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Table 1. Baseline Regression
Number of days contributed per household
————————————————————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time since annexed 0.535*** 0.596*** 0.510*** 0.453*** 0.409*** 0.418*** 0.763*** 0.520***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.073) (0.081)
Average household size 4.018*** 2.617***
(0.694) (0.828)
Percentage of urban households -3.099*** -0.522
(0.537) (0.684)
Average head age -0.282*** -0.106**
(0.050) (0.053)
Percentage of male heads 13.098*** 3.676**
(1.676) (1.714)
Percentage of Kinh heads -5.872*** -2.267**
(0.782) (0.883)
Average head schooling years -0.904*** -0.242
(0.133) (0.166)
Constant 0.427 -15.123*** 1.276*** 14.339*** -8.950*** 5.848*** 4.875*** -3.661
(0.317) (2.738) (0.327) (2.449) (1.291) (0.773) (0.685) (4.178)
Mean value of dep. var. 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.235 0.143 0.159 0.202 0.237 0.209 0.308
Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607 607 607
Note: OLS estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2. Additional Control Variables
Number of days contributed per household
————————————————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time since annexed 0.530*** 0.542*** 0.337*** 0.508*** 0.421*** 0.530*** 0.398*** 0.575*
(0.084) (0.081) (0.104) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083) (0.117) (0.308)
Per capita expenditure 0.088 0.195 0.159
(0.113) (0.221) (0.224)
Percentage of cropland area -2.263*** -0.714 -0.890
(0.564) (0.782) (0.815)
Caloric suitability -0.461*** -0.385*** -0.396***
(0.123) (0.126) (0.127)
Elevation 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Ruggedness 0.851*** 0.113 0.076
(0.219) (0.376) (0.379)
Population density 0.010 -0.725** -0.647**
(0.069) (0.317) (0.320)
Latitude -0.146
(0.237)
Constant -3.892 -4.377 4.544 -7.780* -6.695 -3.832 -1.443 0.354
(4.177) (4.135) (5.453) (4.157) (4.090) (4.288) (5.828) (6.120)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean value of dep. var. 4.05 4.05 4.27 4.05 4.05 4.11 4.27 4.27
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.322 0.332 0.330 0.329 0.312 0.358 0.358
Observations 607 607 555 607 607 591 552 552
Note: OLS estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls are household characteristics aggregated at
district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender, age and schooling years.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3. IV Estimation
Second stage Number of days contributed per household
———————————————————————————
OLS IV
——————————— ————————————–
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time since annexed 0.409*** 0.377** 0.432*** 0.684*** 0.535*** 0.413**
(0.152) (0.149) (0.162) (0.172) (0.163) (0.195)
First stage Time since being annexed
———————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to Nghe An na na na -0.376*** -0.404*** -0.485***
na na na (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
Exogeneity (p-value) na na na 0.007 0.111 0.887
Kleibergen-Paap F na na na 289 331 359
Adjusted R2 na na na 0.645 0.691 0.819
Demographic controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Additional controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Mean value of dep. var. 2.24 2.24 2.27 2.24 2.24 2.27
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.098 0.158 na na na
Observations 311 311 287 311 311 287
Note: Two stages least squares estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses, constant terms in
both stages are suppressed to save space. Demographic controls are household characteristics aggregated
at district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender,
age and schooling years. Additional controls include per capita expenditure, percentage of cropland
area, caloric suitability index, elevation, terrain ruggedness and population density. All regressions only
include districts in the annexed areas.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4. Alternative Mechanisms
Number of days contributed per household
————————————————————————————————————————
Population Movement Annexed Areas Western Influence
——————————— ——————————— ———————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time since annexed 0.469*** 0.421*** 0.271** 0.467*** 0.439** 0.430*** 0.371* 0.414* 0.351*
(0.054) (0.079) (0.107) (0.159) (0.170) (0.160) (0.206) (0.215) (0.207)
Cochinchina -0.518 -0.143 -0.634
(0.557) (0.561) (1.043)
Demographic controls NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Additional controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Mean value of dep. var. 3.37 3.37 3.50 1.87 1.87 1.95 1.87 1.87 1.95
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.223 0.272 0.060 0.153 0.172 0.060 0.150 0.170
Observations 478 478 445 249 249 238 249 249 238
Note: OLS estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses, constant terms are suppressed to save space. Demographic
controls are household characteristics aggregated at district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head
ethnicity, gender, age and schooling years. Additional controls include per capita expenditure, percentage of cropland area, caloric
suitability index, elevation, terrain ruggedness and population density. Columns 1-3 exclude all districts whose elevation are above
500 meters and belong to two municipalities, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. Columns 4-9 continue to exclude districts in the initial
territory of historical Vietnam.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5. Distribution of Types, Unconditional Contribution, and Belief
NORTH SOUTH
(n = 138) (n = 235)
————————————————– ————————————————–
Distribution Av. Un. Con. Belief Distribution Av. Un. Con. Belief
(%) (Tokens) (Tokens) (%) (Tokens) (Tokens)
All subjects 100 7.50 8.25 100 6.58 7.60
(3.92) (3.46) (4.07) (4.11)
Conditional cooperators 57.12 7.29 8.19 54.04 6.39 7.88
(3.20) (3.72) (3.35) (4.07)
Free riders 3.62 0.60 6.20 5.53 2.69 6.54
(0.55) (4.55) (3.88) (3.55)
Hump-shaped cooperators 5.80 10.50 8.38 4.26 6.90 6.70
(5.45) (3.42) (5.92) (5.19)
Others 38.41 7.98 8.49 36.17 7.42 7.44
(4.03) (2.98) (4.51) (4.15)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Av. Un. Con. = average unconditional contribution. Belief = belief about the
average unconditional contribution of other two groups members.
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Table 6. Unconditional Contribution: Regression Analysis
Unconditional contribution
—————————————————————————————————————–
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
North 0.892** 0.789* -1.409 -1.370 -1.345 -1.292 -1.375 -1.183
(0.435) (0.410) (0.966) (0.976) (0.976) (0.970) (0.973) (0.999)
Belief 0.294*** 0.215*** 0.220*** 0.228*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.235***
(0.059) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)
North×Belief 0.276** 0.271** 0.260** 0.275** 0.269** 0.249**
(0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.125)
Conditional cooperator -0.500 -0.422
(0.410) (0.409)
Risk attitude 0.107* 0.104
(0.065) (0.066)
Trust in friends -0.677 -0.572
(0.627) (0.614)
Socially oriented 0.340 0.407
(0.405) (0.407)
Constant 5.533*** 3.618*** 4.237*** 4.484*** 3.632*** 4.724*** 3.942*** 3.938***
(0.680) (0.805) (0.822) (0.848) (0.976) (0.953) (0.857) (1.111)
Socioeconomic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.085 0.097 0.099 0.102 0.099 0.098 0.105
Observations 373 373 373 373 368 373 372 367
Note: OLS estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes 138 students from the north and 235
students from the south. Socioeconomic controls include a male dummy, household size and a wealth index.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix
Table A1. Variable Description
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max N Source
Main Variables
Having contribution Percentage of household making labor contribution 0.31 0.33 0 1 607 VHLSS
Members contributed Average number of members per household making labor contribution 0.55 0.65 0 4.10 607 VHLSS
Days contributed Average number of days contributed per household 4.05 5.63 0 41 607 VHLSS
Time since annexed Number of 100 years since being annexed into historical Vietnam 6.77 3.57 2.33 10.22 607 Archives
Demographic Characteristics
Household size Average number of members per household 3.77 0.49 1.80 7.50 607 VHLSS
Urban Percentage of households residing in urban areas 0.22 0.32 0 1 607 VHLSS
Head age Average age of household head 47.41 4.43 26.60 66.40 607 VHLSS
Male head Percentage of household head being male 0.78 0.13 0.27 1 607 VHLSS
Kinh head Percentage of household head with Kinh ethnicity 0.79 0.35 0 1 607 VHLSS
Head schooling years Average schooling years of household head 6.63 2.14 0.60 13.59 607 VHLSS
Other Control Variables
Per capita expenditure Average real per capita expenditure (million dong) 3.51 2.29 0.89 21.96 607 VHLSS
Cropland area (%) Percentage of cropland in total area (1992-1993) 0.45 0.36 0 1 607 GLCCv2 (EROS)
Caloric suitabilitya Average yield (million kilo calories per km2 per year) 25.10 2.49 15.88 31.74 555 Galor & Özak (2016)
Elevation Average height above sea level (km) 0.20 0.30 0.001 1.56 607 GTOPO30 (EROS)
Terrain ruggedness Average topographic heterogeneity (100 m) 1.14 1.43 0 6.27 607 Nunn & Puga (2012)
Population densitya Thousand persons per km2 in 1990 0.75 2.47 0.01 35.33 591 GPWv3 (CIESIN)
Latitude Latitude (degree) 16.44 4.79 8.65 23.24 607 GAUL (FAO)
Distance to Nghe An Mainland distance to modern Nghe An (100 km) 6.12 4.47 0 14.70 607 GAUL (FAO)
Note: All variables are constructed at district level. Data from the VHLSS 2002 are aggregated without sampling weights. Missing data in a are owning to spatial operation.
VHLSS: Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey.
GLCC: Global Land Cover Characteristics Database Version 2.0.
GTOPO30: Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation Dataset.
EROS: Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science, United States Geological Survey.
GPWv3: Gridded Population of the World Version 3.
CIESIN: Center for International Earth Science Information Network.
GAUL: Global Administrative Unit Layers.
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations.
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Table A2a. Percentage of Households Making Labor Contribution
Percentage of Households
————————————————————————————————————————
Baseline Alternative Mechanisms
———————————– —————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time since annexed 0.028*** 0.017** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.029** 0.028* 0.016 0.022
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Cochinchina -0.072 -0.045
(0.048) (0.073)
Constant 0.121** 0.517* 0.508 0.289 0.357 -0.294 0.261 -0.185 0.486
(0.051) (0.279) (0.356) (0.285) (0.332) (0.434) (0.637) (0.433) (0.728)
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional controls NO NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Mean value of dep. var. 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.348 0.375 0.281 0.319 0.156 0.193 0.162 0.191
Observations 607 607 552 478 445 249 238 249 238
Note: OLS estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls are household characteristics aggregated
at district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender, age and schooling years.
Additional controls include per capita expenditure, percentage of cropland area, caloric suitability index, elevation, terrain ruggedness
and population density. Columns 4-5 exclude all districts whose elevation are above 500 meters and belong to two municipalities,
Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. Columns 6-9 continue to exclude districts in the initial territory of historical Vietnam.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A2b. Percentage of Households Making Labor Contribution
Second stage Percentage of households
———————————————————————————
OLS IV
——————————— ————————————–
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time since annexed 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.032** 0.065*** 0.048*** 0.041**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016)
First stage Time since being annexed
———————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to Nghe An na na na -0.376*** -0.404*** -0.485***
na na na (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
Exogeneity (p-value) na na na 0.000 0.011 0.333
Kleibergen-Paap F na na na 289 331 359
Adjusted R2 na na na 0.645 0.691 0.819
Demographic controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Additional controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Mean value of dep. var. 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.183 0.224 na na na
Observations 311 311 287 311 311 287
Note: Two stages least squares estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses, constant terms in
both stages are suppressed to save space. Demographic controls are household characteristics aggregated
at district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender,
age and schooling years. Additional controls include per capita expenditure, percentage of cropland
area, caloric suitability index, elevation, terrain ruggedness and population density. All regressions only
include districts in the annexed areas.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3a. Number of Members per Household Making Labor Contribution
Number of members per household
————————————————————————————————————————
Baseline Alternative Mechanisms
———————————– —————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time since annexed 0.056*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.075** 0.067** 0.051 0.052
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.036)
Cochinchina -0.142 -0.125
(0.091) (0.142)
Constant 0.172* 0.329 0.046 0.023 0.077 -0.634 1.219 -0.418 1.846
(0.095) (0.535) (0.699) (0.532) (0.620) (0.799) (1.385) (0.776) (1.543)
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional controls NO NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Mean value of dep. var. 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.46 0.48 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.370 0.406 0.294 0.336 0.186 0.239 0.194 0.239
Observations 607 607 552 478 445 249 238 249 238
Note: OLS estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls are household characteristics aggregated
at district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender, age and schooling years.
Additional controls include per capita expenditure, percentage of cropland area, caloric suitability index, elevation, terrain ruggedness
and population density. Columns 4-5 exclude all districts whose elevation are above 500 meters and belong to two municipalities, Ha
Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. Columns 6-9 continue to exclude districts in the initial territory of historical Vietnam.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3b. Number of Members per Household Making Labor Contribution
Second stage Number of members per household
———————————————————————————
OLS IV
——————————— ————————————–
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time since annexed 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069** 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.090***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.031)
First stage Time since being annexed
———————————————————————————
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to Nghe An na na na -0.376*** -0.404*** -0.485***
na na na (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
Exogeneity (p-value) na na na 0.000 0.002 0.185
Kleibergen-Paap F na na na 289 331 359
Adjusted R2 na na na 0.645 0.691 0.819
Demographic controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Additional controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Mean value of dep. var. 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.185 0.249 na na na
Observations 311 311 287 311 311 287
Note: Two stages least squares estimator with robust standard errors in parentheses, constant terms in
both stages are suppressed to save space. Demographic controls are household characteristics aggregated
at district level including the number of members, residing in urban area, and head ethnicity, gender,
age and schooling years. Additional controls include per capita expenditure, percentage of cropland
area, caloric suitability index, elevation, terrain ruggedness and population density. All regressions only
include districts in the annexed areas.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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